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ABSTRACT 
 Alternative economic theories yield dramatically different prescriptions for optimal 
capital taxation in small open economies. On the one hand, foreign firms, including those 
with investments that yield firm-specific above-normal returns, have a large number of 
alternative investment opportunities; this suggests that the supply of foreign direct 
investment is highly elastic, which implies that small open economies should avoid 
imposing any source-based taxes on capital income. On the other hand, governments 
invariably want to tax any above-normal returns earned by location-specific capital, 
especially if the returns accrue to foreigners, and to take full advantage of the potential 
revenue increase from any “treasury transfer” effect that arises due to residence-based tax 
systems with foreign tax credits, such as that utilized by the United States. These factors 
suggest that investment is highly inelastic with respect to capital taxation, so that source-
based capital income taxation is desirable; indeed, in one special case, the capital income 
tax rate for a small open economy should equal the relatively high US tax rate. Moreover, 
this difficult trade-off is in practice complicated by numerous additional factors: deferral 
of unrepatriated profits and cross-crediting of foreign tax credits for US multinationals, 
foreign direct investment from firms from countries that, unlike the United States, operate 
territorial systems, and the existence of opportunities for both international capital 
income shifting and labor income shifting. In this paper, we analyze optimal capital 
income taxation in a small open economy model that attempts to balance these 
conflicting factors. 
 
JEL Codes: H21, H25 
Key Words: Optimal Taxation; Open Economy; Income Shifting; Corporate Taxation 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 Under the appropriate assumptions, optimal tax theory provides a striking result on the 
use of source-based taxes on capital income such as the typical corporate income tax: in a small 
open economy that cannot affect the after-tax return to internationally mobile capital or the 
prices of tradable goods, the optimal capital income tax rate is zero (Gordon 1986; Razin and 
Sadka 1991; Zodrow and Mieszkowski 1983).1 This result does not rely on – although it is 
reinforced by – concerns about the negative effects of capital income taxation on domestic 
saving or the distortions of many types of investment decisions under the typical corporate 
income tax (Nicodème 2008), or the tendency toward under-provision of public services 
financed with capital income taxes in the presence of international tax competition (Zodrow and 
Mieszkowski 1986; Wilson 1986). Instead, the argument follows from the assumption that the 
small open economy faces a perfectly elastic supply of highly mobile international capital. In 
this case, the imposition of a source-based tax on capital income will simply cause 
internationally mobile capital to migrate to other countries until its after-tax return in the taxing 
country increases to the internationally determined rate of return. This emigration of capital 
lowers the productivity of the fixed factors in the taxing country – land, labor (or at least 
relatively immobile labor), and any immobile capital – so that local factors of production 
ultimately bear the entire burden of the capital income tax, including both the revenue raised 
and the efficiency costs of the tax due to capital emigration (as well as the other distortionary 
costs noted above). Indeed, Harberger (1995, 2008) argues that immobile labor and land may 
bear more than one hundred percent of a corporate income tax in a small open economy, once 
general equilibrium effects across business sectors are considered.   
 This argument is reinforced by two additional considerations in the modern global 
economy. The first is a straightforward extension of the basic argument, applied to investments 
by multinational corporations (MNCs) that generate significant firm-specific economic rents; 
such rents are attributable to factors unique to the firm such as specialized and patented 
technological knowledge, superior managerial skills or production techniques, or valuable 
product brands, trademarks, reputations, and other intangible assets (Dunning 1981). Moreover, 
                                                 
1
  For further discussion, see Zodrow (2010a, b). 
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there is some empirical evidence that the relative importance of such rents is increasing over 
time, as Auerbach (2006) shows that the dispersion of relative profitability for US corporations 
has increased significantly in recent years, suggesting an increase in the importance of 
investments that generate above-normal returns made by a relatively small number of highly 
profitable firms. Because such firm-specific capital is likely to be especially mobile and also 
may have the potential for significant increases in the productivity of local factors (e.g., it is 
most likely to be associated with high levels of technology transfer, access to skilled labor 
including highly effective management, and the generation of other external benefits including 
the creation of a competitive environment that fosters invention and innovation), concerns about 
tax-induced emigration of mobile capital may be especially pronounced for such investments, 
reinforcing the standard zero-tax argument (Gordon and Hines 2002). 
 The second issue has been the focus of many recent policy discussions, most recently in 
the Base Erosion and Profit Shifting project of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) (2013). Specifically, the application of a relatively high corporate tax rate 
to the income of MNCs encourages them to engage in profit shifting, that is, to use various 
financial manipulations, including transfer pricing, the relocation of the ownership of intangibles, 
and the use of loan reallocations that facilitate interest stripping, to shift revenues to relatively 
low tax countries and deductions to relatively high-tax countries.  There is considerable 
empirical evidence of income shifting (Clausing 2011, 2016; Dowd 2016), in particular that a 
relatively high statutory corporate tax rate encourages income shifting, since it is the statutory 
tax rate that determines the value to the firm of shifted revenues and deductions. Thus a desire to 
avoid creating incentives for income shifting also puts downward pressure on capital income tax 
rates.2 
Despite these arguments, as well as empirical evidence of the importance of international 
tax competition (Devereux and Loretz 2013), corporate income tax rates in small open 
economies have not in practice converged to zero (although they have declined on average over 
time). A wide variety of arguments have been offered in support of corporate taxation, all of 
which qualify the argument that a small open economy should exempt capital income from tax.  
                                                 
2
  Furthermore, a low statutory rate may make a country attractive for investment by MNCs simply because it 
creates the potential for additional income shifting (Slemrod 1997). 
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Although it is difficult to judge the relative importance of each of these qualifications, the 
pervasiveness of corporate income taxation around the world suggests that together these 
arguments have been taken seriously by policymakers. 
 Perhaps the most important argument in support of a relatively high level of source-based 
capital income taxation is that it allows the government to obtain significant revenues from the 
taxation of location-specific economic rents.  Such rents, which may accrue to both 
domestically-owned firms and firms that are partially or fully owned by foreigners, can reflect 
resource rents as well as economic rents that arise because of factors such as local economies of 
agglomeration, productive government infrastructure, easier access to consumer markets 
(including those for financial services), lower transport costs, and inexpensive but relatively 
productive local factors of production including skilled labor – in addition to the ability to avoid 
trade barriers such as tariffs and quotas.   
The taxation of location-specific economic rents provides an efficient and thus highly 
desirable source of revenue.  Moreover, such taxes are especially attractive from the standpoint 
of domestic residents and thus from a political perspective if the rents accrue to foreigners 
(Mintz 1995).  Empirical evidence suggests that a higher share of foreign ownership in a 
country tends to result in a higher average corporate income tax rate (Huizinga and Nicodème 
2006).  
A second argument is related to the prevalence of income shifting noted above. 
Specifically, although a high domestic corporate tax rate tends to encourage more income 
shifting, the existence of income shifting to some extent mitigates the negative effect of a high 
statutory tax rate on foreign direct investment by MNCs, since firms know they will be able to 
avoid some of the costs of a high tax rate in a host country by shifting income to lower tax 
countries.  Indeed, to the extent that such tax avoidance opportunities are available primarily to 
MNCs and such firms are more mobile than domestic companies, a relatively high statutory rate 
may be desirable as part of a strategy that attracts FDI at minimal revenue cost by imposing a 
high tax burden on relatively immobile domestic capital but a low effective tax burden, taking 
into account tax avoidance activities, on relatively mobile international capital (Hong and Smart 
2010; Gugl and Zodrow 2006).  An aggressive version of this strategy would include lax 
enforcement of the many rules currently used to limit tax avoidance by MNCs or even explicit 
regulations that facilitate such tax avoidance – the new variation of international tax 
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competition stressed by Altshuler and Grubert (2006), which they note is exemplified by the 
long-time existence of the “check-the-box” rules in the United States.   
A third argument for a relatively high corporate tax rate in a small open economy was 
once believed to be compelling, but has been declining in importance over time. Specifically, 
the “treasury transfer” argument suggests that a host country that imports capital primarily from  
countries that use residence-based corporate income tax systems and grant foreign tax credits 
(FTCs) should raise its tax rate approximately to the rate utilized by those countries, since such 
a rate increase will essentially transfer revenues from the treasury of the home countries to the 
treasury of the host country without having any deleterious effects on FDI (since the combined 
host and home countries tax burden borne by the MNC is always determined solely by the 
statutory tax rate of the home country).  
 The prospect of such a “free” source of tax revenue is naturally appealing and has been 
stressed in many tax policy discussions.  However, there are at least three reasons the treasury 
transfer effect is often argued to be of limited relevance in the modern economy. First, because 
both Japan and the United Kingdom have recently switched to “territorial” tax systems under 
which foreign-source income is largely tax exempt, the United States is now the only major 
industrialized country that utilizes a residence-based tax system with an FTC.  Thus, the 
treasury transfer argument is potentially relevant only for countries that import significant 
amounts of capital from the United States.3 Second, because of various limitations placed on the 
use of foreign tax credits, many US multinationals are in an “excess foreign tax credit” position 
– that is, they already have more credits than they can use currently, so that additional credits 
are of limited value and a lower host country tax rate should attract additional FDI.  Third, the 
importance of the treasury transfer effect is limited by the fact that host country taxes are 
assessed currently but foreign tax credits in the home country are not granted until the funds are 
repatriated to the parent firm. Indeed, under certain circumstances, a home country repatriation 
tax has no effect on investment financed with the retained earnings of the subsidiary (Hartman 
1985; Sinn 1987) – although the relevance in practice of this proposition has been the subject of 
                                                 
3
  Although the relative importance of FDI from the United States has of course declined in recent years, it is still 
significant in many countries. For example, the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (2012) 
reports that the U.S. accounts for roughly a quarter of foreign direct investment in Latin America and the Caribbean.  
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debate; in particular, Grubert and Altshuler (2013, Appendix A) argue that the Hartman-Sinn 
model is based on very restrictive assumptions and its predictions are inconsistent with the 
empirical data on repatriations.  
It is also interesting to note, however, that the importance of the treasury transfer effect 
may be increasing – currently and perhaps to a significantly greater extent in the near future – 
for host countries with relatively low tax rates. Specifically, many capital-exporting countries 
have become increasingly concerned about revenue losses due to income shifting by 
multinationals, especially to very low rate tax haven countries, and are enacting, or considering 
the enactment of, what are broadly referred to as “anti-base-erosion” provisions (OECD 2013). 
Although such provisions may take many forms, one common approach is to impose current 
home country taxes on income that is earned in relatively low-rate jurisdictions. For example, 
the new territorial tax system in Japan includes Controlled Foreign Company (CFC) provisions 
under which Japanese companies are required to report as domestic income taxable profits 
earned in any country with an effective tax rate of 20 percent or less (Deloitte 2014).  
Similar provisions have been proposed in the context of reform of the system of 
international taxation in the United States. For example, the discussion draft put forward by 
Representative Dave Camp includes an anti-base-erosion provision under which foreign-source 
income from intangibles derived from sales to foreign markets would be taxed in the United 
States in the year earned at a 15 percent rate, subject to credits for foreign taxes paid, while 
foreign-source income from intangibles derived from sales to the US market would be taxed in 
the year earned at a 25 percent rate — all relative to a proposed general corporate statutory tax 
rate of 25 percent.4 The discussion draft released by Senator Max Baucus would tax all passive 
and highly mobile foreign-source income, as well as foreign-source income earned from selling 
goods and services back to the U.S., in the year earned at the statutory corporate tax rate, subject 
to credits for foreign taxes paid. Foreign-source income from products and services sold abroad 
would similarly be taxed currently, although at reduced rates.5  Both of these proposals could 
                                                 
4
  Details of the Camp discussion draft are available at 
http://waysandmeans.house.gov/UploadedFiles/Statutory_Text_Tax_Reform_Act_of_2014_Discussion_Draft__022
614.pdf.  
5
  Details of the Baucus discussion draft are available at http://www.finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Chairman's 
Staff International Discussion Draft Summary.pdf. 
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significantly increase the relevance of the treasury transfer effect, although within the context of 
a lower US corporate tax rate. 
Numerous other arguments support some source-based capital income taxation, often in 
the form of a corporate income tax. From a domestic perspective, a corporate income tax is 
often deemed to be desirable as a “backstop” to the personal income tax; that is, depending on 
relative personal and corporate tax rates, a corporate income tax may be desirable to prevent 
individuals from incorporating and deferring personal income tax on labor income by retaining 
the earnings in corporate form while financing any desired consumption with loans from their 
companies. In addition, the small open economy assumptions may be too extreme for some 
countries; Gravelle and Smetters (2006) stress that the economic effects of corporate income 
taxes differ significantly if capital is imperfectly mobile or if traded and domestically-produced 
goods are imperfect substitutes. Finally, a corporate income tax may be politically indispensable 
in many countries. 
Relatively few papers have examined the interactions of these competing effects on capital 
income taxation from the perspective of an open economy. Four papers are particularly relevant 
to our analysis.  
Gordon and Mackie-Mason (1995) consider the interaction of domestic income shifting 
and international income shifting. In their model, an optimal tax system balances the cost from 
individuals disguising labor income as capital income when the capital income tax rate is 
lowered against the benefit of an increase in the tax base due to reduced international income 
shifting.6   
 Huizinga and Nielsen (1997) examine optimal rules for separate taxes on all capital 
income and on above-normal profits in a small open economy model where foreigners own 
some of the domestic capital stock. They show that, as long as above-normal profits are taxed at 
rates less than one hundred percent, some source-based taxation of capital income is desirable to 
extract rents from foreign owners of domestic capital. 
                                                 
6
  See also Gordon and Slemrod (2000), who estimate the extent of income shifting between the personal and 
corporate income tax bases following the enactment of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, and Slemrod and Wilson 
(2009) who investigate the effects of such shifting in the presence of low-rate tax havens. 
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Becker and Fuest (2011) examine how differences in capital mobility and profitability 
affect the desirability of base broadening, rate reducing (BBRR) corporate reforms relative to 
introducing investment incentives. Specifically, they show that under certain circumstances a 
BBRR reform that involves a corporate rate reduction financed by less generous deductions for 
depreciation is preferable to increasing investment incentives if relatively more mobile firms are 
also more profitable than their relatively immobile competitors. The intuition is that a lower 
statutory rate is desirable to attract/retain the more mobile firms which are highly responsive to 
the statutory rate since that is the rate applied to its above-normal profits, even at the cost of 
reducing investment incentives (accelerated depreciation), which are relatively more important 
in determining the tax burden of the comparatively immobile less profitable firms.  
Finally, Haufler and Schjelderup (2000) construct a model that includes foreign direct 
investment and the possibility of income shifting. Like Becker and Fuest (2011), they show that 
under certain circumstances a BBRR reform that involves a corporate rate reduction financed by 
less generous deductions for depreciation is desirable, as the gains from reducing income 
shifting are unambiguously larger than the costs of reducing investment incentives.   
In a similar vein, we construct a simple theoretical model that illustrates how the 
government of a small open economy might balance some of the trade-offs involved in taxing 
capital income described above, and then simulate a more complicated version of the model to 
see how much optimal capital income tax rates might vary from zero under scenarios that take 
into account the interactions between the various factors analyzed.7 We maintain the standard 
small open economy assumptions of perfect mobility (of certain forms of) capital and perfect 
substitutability of domestic and foreign tradable goods in our model. In our base analytical 
model, we focus on the trade-offs involved in balancing (1) the costs of taxing highly mobile 
capital, including firm-specific capital earning above-normal returns, and (2) the costs of 
                                                 
7
  To simplify the analysis, we model a single “capital income tax rate” ( t ), which serves as a proxy for a 
combination of the various relevant tax rates. For example, the relevant capital income tax rate would be the 
statutory rate for equity-financed domestic investment under a system that measured real economic income 
accurately (e.g., with tax depreciation equal to inflation-adjusted economic depreciation and no other investment 
allowances). In practice, tax systems are far more complicated, with lower effective tax rates due to interest 
deductions for debt-financed investment and accelerated depreciation deductions, investment tax credits, etc. In 
addition, different tax rates are relevant at different margins – the statutory rate is most relevant for income shifting, 
some combination of the statutory rate and the effective tax rate is most relevant for investment of firm-specific 
capital, and the effective tax rate is most relevant for investment of ordinary capital. Note, however, that we do 
model explicitly the reduction in the effective capital income tax rate due to income shifting.   
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encouraging income shifting to lower-tax jurisdictions, against (3) the gains from taxing 
location-specific capital, some of which is foreign-owned, (4) the mitigating effects on tax-
induced reductions of FDI of the presence income shifting possibilities, and (5) the potential for 
a treasury transfer effect. Our base model does not include explicit costs of income shifting or 
the potential for disguising labor income as capital income. However, we include these features 
in our computational model, which also includes ordinary capital in both production sectors, 
endogenous labor supply, a proportional labor income tax, and the possibility of direct taxation 
of location-specific capital. We describe the structure of our base model in the following 
section, and the characteristics of the solution for the optimal capital income tax rate in Section 
3.  The details of the expanded computational model are presented in Section 4, which also 
provides the results of simulating that model for the optimal capital income tax rate for a wide 
variety of parameter values.  Conclusions and directions for future research are discussed in the 
final section.  
2. THE BASE MODEL 
 Our base analytical model is designed to capture four of the primary factors that influence 
the optimal capital income tax rate in a small open economy: (1) immobile capital that earns 
location-specific rents, some of which may be owned by foreigners; (2) perfectly mobile foreign-
owned capital that earns firm-specific rents; (3) the possibility of capital income shifting; and (4) 
the possibility of residual home country taxation of foreign-source income by countries that 
operate a residence-based system of taxation, such as the United States, or countries like Japan 
that have base erosion provisions that apply domestic tax on an accrual basis to income earned in 
host countries with sufficiently low tax rates, subject to foreign tax credits. 
 To capture these effects we construct a simple two-sector model. Sector one is a 
“domestic” sector that produces a non-traded good 1( )X  using labor  
(L
1
) and location-specific 
capital (LSK) that is fixed, immobile, and earns economic rents ( )L  that may be partially or 
completely foreign-owned. Sector two is a “multinational” sector that produces a traded good 
2( )X  using labor  
(L
2
)  and firm-specific capital (FSK) that is perfectly mobile, foreign-owned, 
and earns economic rents at an internationally determined rate of return ( )F . The price of the 
traded good 2( )p  is also determined internationally, and it is possible that the small open 
economy may be either a net importer or a net exporter. The domestic good is produced using a 
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constant returns to scale technology,  1 1 1;X F L LSK . The earnings of capital in the domestic 
sector are subject to capital income taxation at a statutory tax rate  , so the profit-maximizing 
labor demand in sector one is the solution to  
1
1 1 1max
L
p X wL , where 1p  is the market price of 
good one and w  is the market wage. In equilibrium, the before-tax economic rents earned by LSK 
are   1 1 11 LLSK wp LX    . Note that in order to simplify the model, we treat the corporate 
tax simply as applying to all capital income, and thus do not consider many complicating and 
distortionary features of actual corporate income taxes, including deductions for economic 
depreciation, accelerated depreciation deductions, investment tax credits and other investment 
preferences, the treatment of inflation, as well as differential treatment of equity and debt 
finance, especially deductions for interest expense.  
 Production in the multinational or traded goods sector is a function of the amounts of 
labor 2( )L  and FSK utilized,  22 2 ,F LX FSK .
8 The earnings of the firm-specific capital in 
the multinational sector are in principle also subject to the statutory capital income tax rate. 
However, a fraction  S  of capital income in this multinational sector is shifted to a tax haven 
country with a relatively low tax rate H ; the fraction shifted is a function of the tax differential 
H  . Only the unshifted share of capital income (1 )S  is subject to the domestic tax. In 
addition, a fraction F  of the unshifted income is also subject to a current residual tax imposed 
by the foreign (home) country at tax rate F . We assume that none of the capital income shifted 
to the tax haven is subject to a residual tax.   
 Consequently, the effective capital income tax rate in the multinational sector, taking into 
account income shifting to tax havens and residual home country current taxation, is 
                                                 
8
  Following the approach used in the CORTAX computable general equilbrium model constructed by Bettendorf et 
al. (2009) and de Mooij and Devereux (2011), we model the factor generating firm-specific rents as an explicit 
production input characterized by “fixed management capacity.” That is, we assume a fixed amount of firm-specific 
capital (which includes a combination of factors such as unique managerial skills, production processes, and 
intangible capital) that must be allocated among different locations around the world. A similar approach is used by 
Becker and Fuest (2011), who consider “ownership skill” that creates above-normal returns, assuming first that the 
amount of this skill is fixed and must be allocated across countries, and then extending the analysis to the case in 
which ownership skill is unlimited.  Devereux, Fuest, and Lockwood (2014) consider both cases as well as 
intermediate possibilities. 
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 (1 ) max( ,0)S F HK F ST            . Given any level of FSK, the multinational firms in 
sector two choose labor to maximize profit. The amount of firm-specific capital invested is the 
amount consistent with after-tax earnings equal to the internationally-determined rate of return 
F , taking into account the demand for labor as a function of FSK. That is, the amount of firm-
specific capital invested in the country is such that    2 22 1F Kp wL T FSKX      , where 
both 2X  and 2L  are functions of the firm-specific capital invested.   
In the base model, we assume a single representative resident with inelastic labor supply. 
Consequently, the individual allocates income across consumption goods to maximize utility, 
producing the indirect utility function  
     
1 2
1 1 2 1 1 2 2
,
, max ,
CC
v p I U C CC CI p p  ,  (1) 
where iC  is the consumption of good i , ip  is the market price of good i , and I  is the 
individual’s after-tax income. We hold government services  G  constant throughout the 
analysis and assume they are separable from consumption in the individual’s welfare function. 
Income is composed of labor income and capital income, less any lump-sum taxes levied by the 
government, so that net income is 
 LI wL LSK t  ,  (2) 
where t  is the lump-sum tax, L  is the fixed level of total labor supply, and   is the share of 
location-specific capital that is owned domestically.  
 Government services are modeled as purchases of the tradable good, and government 
revenues are raised from capital income taxation of the returns to LSK and FSK and the lump-
sum tax (which is a proxy for labor income taxation in the base model, given the assumption of 
an inelastic supply of labor). The government budget constraint is thus 
  2 1L S Fp G LSK FSK t      .  (3) 
 Finally, since total labor supply (L) is fixed, equilibrium in the labor market requires 
1 2L LL  , and equilibrium in the domestic good market requires 1 1C X . Combining these 
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two conditions with the first-order conditions for the consumer and producer optimization 
problems fully specifies the equilibrium in the model. 
 
3. PROPERTIES OF THE OPTIMAL CAPITAL INCOME TAX RATE 
3.1 Characterizing the Optimal Capital Income Tax Rate 
 The government chooses its tax rates to maximize the utility of the representative resident 
while ensuring that revenues are sufficient to finance a fixed level of the separable public good 
(G), which is modeled as purchases of the output of the multinational sector. The government 
thus solves 
     2
,
1max , 1 SL F
t
p G Lv p I SK FSK t

          ,    
where  1,v p I  is the individual indirect utility function, the government budget constraint is 
 2 1L FSLSK FSKp G t R t        , and R is capital income tax revenue. Since the 
lump-sum tax is always available to the government, the capital income tax will be used only if it 
can successfully extract resources from foreign investors, that is, if some of the tax burden can 
successfully be “exported” abroad. Note that the capital tax is applied to all unshifted capital 
income earned in the country. Substituting from the government budget constraint, the 
government’s problem becomes 
  
 
    2
1max , ;
1 .L SL FI p G
v p I
wL LSK LSK FSK

         
 (4) 
Thus, since income is defined to include the head tax, any revenue shortfalls that arise due to 
outmigration of FSK or any declines in the return to LSK associated with increases in the capital 
income tax rate must be offset with head tax increases. 
 The first-order condition for the optimal capital income tax rate is 
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1 1 1 1 1 1
1
1 1
1
( , ) 1 1
0
( , )1
0,I C p
I
v p I p p p C pv v I I I
C
p I I I p
v p I
 
      
 
 


          
         
          

  
  (5)
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using Roy’s Identity, and defining 
1
and I p   as the tax semi-elasticities of the subscripted 
variables, 
1
I
C as the expenditure share of good one, and   as the marginal utility of income. 
This condition reflects the standard result that the optimal capital income tax rate should be set to 
maximize the dollar value of individual utility at the margin, which requires that the change in 
real income, or the sum of the “sources” and “uses” effects on utility, equals zero. This 
expression can be interpreted in terms of several key tax semi-elasticities. 
3.1.1 Tax Semi-elasticity of Income  
 The tax semi-elasticity of income is  
 
 1
1
L S
I I R R
I L w LSK LSK FSK FSK
R R R
I I I
       

 
      
           
      
,  (6)
 
 
where the various 's  are factor shares in income or total capital income tax revenue (R). The 
tax semi-elasticity of income is thus determined by the changes in the returns to the two fixed 
factors in response to an increase in the capital income tax and the change in the head tax, which 
equals the change in capital tax revenues, taking into account the effects of the tax on FSK and 
L . 
3.1.2 Tax Semi-elasticity of the Wage  
 To obtain the tax semi-elasticity of the wage, recall that in the multinational sector the 
effective tax rate on FSK is
 
   1 max ,0S F F S HKT              . We assume that F   
for this derivation, so that 
  
    1 1 1S S S HK F F FT              ,   
which implies that 
  
       11 1 1 1 S
K
S F HS F FF
T
       



       
 (7) 
is a constant determined by the extent of income shifting and residual taxation. With constant 
returns to scale in labor and FSK in the multinational sector, differentiating the unit cost function 
with respect to   for fixed F  yields 22 0FGFSL w K       ,  where the   terms are gross 
factor shares in production costs and    1
FG K K
TT     is the tax semi-elasticity of the 
gross rate of return to FSK. Thus, with a fixed commodity price and a fixed return to FSK in the 
multinational sector, any increase in the capital income tax burden is fully reflected in a 
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reduction in wages – consistent with the traditional small open economy reasoning described 
above.  
3.1.3 Tax Semi-elasticity of the Price of Good One  
 Similarly, with constant returns to scale in labor and LSK in the domestic sector, 
 
1 1 1 1 1
1
1LG L
p L w LSK L w LSK         

 
     
 
 . (8) 
Thus, the tax semi-elasticity of the price of the domestic good is determined by a weighted 
average of the tax semi-elasticities of the gross prices of the two inputs, labor and location-
specific capital. 
3.1.4 Tax Semi-elasticity of the Return to Location-specific Capital 
 Differentiating the consumer’s first-order condition for the domestic good yields 
 
 
1 1 111 1 1
I
C p IC       , where 11  is the compensated elasticity of demand for good one 
and 1  is the income elasticity of demand for good one. Substituting from (8) yields the price 
and income effects on the tax semi-elasticity of consumer demand 1C   
   
1 111 1 1 1 1
1/ (1 )
L
I
C L w LSK IC                . (9) 
 On the production side, differentiating the production function with fixed location-
specific capital and solving for the tax semi-elasticity of labor demand yields 
   
1 1 1 LGL wX 
        . (10) 
Since the consumption and production tax semi-elasticities of the domestic good are equal, 
equating (9) and (10) and solving for the tax semi-elasticity of the net return to LSK yields 
 
 
 
1
1
11 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 11 1
1
1L
I
C L w I
I
L LSK C

      

    



 

 . (11) 
Note that in the case of Cobb-Douglas utility and production functions, this expression reduces 
to 1/ (1 ),
L I
    
 
which indicates that – apart from the effects of changes in income – the 
gross return to LSK is fixed so that the owners of LSK bear the burden of the capital income tax 
 16 
in that sector. Otherwise, the first term in (11) reflects the net general equilibrium effects on the 
return to LSK of changes in relative prices on consumer demands and factor demands. 
 Substituting (11) into (8) implies that the tax semi-elasticity of the price of the domestic 
good is 
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 
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1
1
11 1 1 1 1
1 1
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C L w I
p L w LSK I
L LSK C
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   
    
  
  
 
 


. (12) 
Note that an income increase thus results in an increase in the relative price of the domestic good 
(since the price of the multinational good is fixed). 
 3.1.5 Tax Semi-elasticity of Firm-specific Capital 
To solve for FSK , calculate the tax semi-elasticity of the multinational sector good using 
the labor market equilibrium equation and the tax semi-elasticity of per-unit labor demand, and 
substitute into the expression for the tax semi-elasticity of demand for FSK to yield 
  
1
1 2
2
1 1
,
1 1L
K
FSK w w
K
T
T


     
  
   
        
     


 (13) 
where 1 1 /L L  2 2, /L L  , and 1 2,   are the elasticities of substitution in production in the 
domestic and multinational sectors, respectively. In the Cobb-Douglas case, this reduces to 
  
1 1
2 2
1
1
1
K
FSK w I
K
T
T
 
  
  
     
        
     
.  (14) 
The first term indicates that an increase in the wage reduces the relative price of FSK (since the 
price of the multinational good is fixed) and thus increases demand for FSK. The second term 
reflects the fact, noted above, that an increase in income results in an increase in the relative 
price of the domestic good and thus the demands for the factors producing that good, while 
decreasing relative factor demands for the factors producing the multinational sector good, thus 
putting downward pressure on the demand for FSK. The more general case reflects the additional 
net general equilibrium effects on the demand for FSK of changes in relative prices on consumer 
demands and factor demands. 
3.1.6 Solving for the Optimal Tax Rate in the Cobb-Douglas Case 
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 To make these expressions more tractable in solving for the optimal  , suppose that the 
production functions are Cobb-Douglas with constant labor shares 1 2,L L  , and the utility 
function is also Cobb-Douglas with constant expenditure shares 
1 2
,I IC C  . In this case, the 
various tax semi-elasticities reduce to 
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. 
Substituting for and 
L FSK
   and solving for the tax semi-elasticity of income yields  
 1 1
2 2
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(15) 
where 1
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1 I R RLSK LSK FSK
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I I





    
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 . Substituting  
1 1 1
1p L w L I        into 
the government’s first-order condition for   (5) and multiplying by D  yields 
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 . (16) 
Substituting from the Cobb-Douglas tax semi-elasticity expressions above yields 
 ,
1 1K
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  (17) 
where 
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Thus, at the capital income tax rate optimum, the static increase in revenue due to an increase in 
the tax rate (the first term in (17), /R I ) is exactly offset by the net effect on real income, 
including endogenous adjustments in the head tax ( /R R I ), and the increase in taxation of 
capital in the domestic sector (the second-to-last term in (17)) and in the multinational sector (the 
last term in (17)). 
3.2 Properties of the Optimal Capital Income Tax Rate 
 In this section, we show that our optimality condition is consistent with the basic results 
discussed in the introduction on (1) zero capital income taxation, and (2) capital income taxation 
at the residual tax rate. First, divide the optimality condition (17) by  and apply 
 1L S FLR SK FSK        so that the optimality condition is well defined at 0  , 
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  (18) 
When there is a zero capital income tax rate, 0R RLSK FSK KT     and (18) simplifies to 
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  (19) 
Assuming that the tax rate in the tax haven is non-zero, 0H  , firms will not shift income to the 
tax haven if the change from 0   is small enough, 1
0
0
S 
 

 . Additionally, at 0  , no 
income shifting occurs ( 0S  ), reducing the wage expression to  
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Recognizing that 
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C L L    , and 2 2 2FSK L F K wLFS    at 0  , 
we can multiply this entire expression by 2 FIL FSK  to get  
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,  (21) 
which is the condition under which a zero capital tax rate is optimal. If all location-specific 
capital is owned domestically ( 1  ), the optimality condition becomes     
   2 1 1 FL L L       
and a zero capital income tax is optimal only if there is no foreign residual tax.  
 To consider the case where a portion of location-specific capital is not owned 
domestically, 1  , rewrite the optimality condition to the form  
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As long as 1  , 1 1 /I ILSK LSK      so that 1 2
L
L
LSK
L
I
L L L
I SK


 
  
 
. Since  1 1F   , 
this suggests the right-hand side of (22) is strictly negative, while 1   implies the left-hand side 
of (22) is strictly positive. Consequently, optimality condition (22) never holds if 1  . This 
suggests that as long as any location-specific capital is foreign-owned, the optimal capital tax 
rate is non-zero, as a portion of location-specific capital represents immobile, foreign-owned, 
above-normal returns (assuming a non-zero tax rate in the tax haven). However, if all location-
specific capital is owned domestically, the optimal capital tax rate is zero if there is no residual 
tax, under the baseline assumption 0H  . 
 We can also characterize the optimal capital income tax rate under full residual taxation. 
If all capital income earned in sector two is subject to residual taxation ( 1F  ) and the domestic 
tax rate is lower than the residual tax rate ( F  ), the optimality condition (17) reduces to 
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By definition, 0 1   and the expression in (23) cannot hold as long as some income is 
unshifted, 1S  . Consequently, if there is full residual taxation, F   is not optimal as long as 
any capital income in sector two is unshifted when F  . 
4. EXTENDED MODEL, PARAMETER VALUES, AND SIMULATION RESULTS 
4.1 Extended Model 
 In this section, we simulate an extended version of the model to obtain an idea of the 
magnitudes of the effects of the various factors on the optimal capital income tax rate. 
Specifically, we expand the individual’s optimization problem to include endogenous labor 
supply, converting the head tax to a proportional tax on labor, and allow for the possibility of 
endogenous labor income shifting to the capital income tax base. Further, we add another factor 
in both production sectors – “ordinary” capital (K) that earns a normal rate of return (r); we 
assume that this factor is also perfectly mobile so that r is fixed. This implies that domestic 
production also includes internationally mobile capital, so that both production sectors are 
affected by the capital tax rate. Both sectors thus now employ three factors in production, which 
we model using CES production functions. Finally, we consider the effects on the optimal capital 
income tax rate of adding an explicit tax on location-specific capital as an additional tax 
instrument available to the government. 
 In the computational model, we use a utility function that enables calibration of the 
income elasticity of labor: 
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All variables correspond to those used in the analytical model above, with the additional terms 
dK  and H  indicating domestic ownership of capital and the labor endowment, respectively, 
with leisure defined as H–L. The wage rate in the individual problem remains net of tax and, as 
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will be discussed below, includes any wages that are shifted to the business income tax base and 
thus subject to the capital income tax. 
Both CES production functions now account for ordinary capital ( 1K  and 2K ), or  
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where 1  and 2  are the elasticities of substitution in production for sectors one and two.  
 Turning next to extensions of the modeling of income shifting, Grubert and Altshuler 
(2013) argue that the costs associated with international income shifting are roughly quadratic.9  
Accordingly, we assume that multinationals engage in income shifting to maximize the 
increment in after-tax profits attributable to such shifting, subject to quadratic adjustment costs. 
Thus, the proportion of capital income shifted to a tax haven  S  satisfies 
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0 1
,0max max
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


  , (27) 
and the total per-unit cost of both types of capital to the multinational sector with income shifting 
is     21 1 ,0maxS F F S H S               .  
 In the domestic economy, some individuals are assumed to be able to shift labor income 
to the business tax base when the capital income tax rate is lower than the labor income tax rate. 
Such shifting maximizes the associated increment in after-tax wage income, again subject to 
quadratic adjustment costs. Only a limited portion ( I ) of labor income, corresponding roughly 
to the share of labor income earned from self-employment or in small closely-held corporations, 
can potentially be shifted. Consequently, the proportion of labor income shifted to the capital 
income tax base  I  satisfies 
                                                 
9
 Most of this discussion is included in their online Appendix A, http://econweb.rutgers.edu/altshule/Fixing-
appendices.pdf. 
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With E  indicating the share of wage income exempt from labor taxation, the gross wage rate, 
including shifting costs, is        211 1 1G E E I L I Iw ww                . Government 
revenue comes from three tax instruments: a capital income tax, a labor income tax, and (in some 
cases) a direct tax on location-specific capital. A fixed share  LSK  of LSK is subject to the 
direct tax, and any of these taxes paid are deductible from the capital income tax base, so the 
total tax revenue raised from location-specific capital income is 
   1 1LSK LSK LSK LSK L LSK LLSKR LSK             . Accounting for income shifting 
behavior, total revenue raised from the taxation of labor income is  1L L I IwL wR L      
and total revenue raised from ordinary and firm-specific capital income is 
    1 2 11 S FSr K K FSKR        . In our simulations, we treat the location-specific 
capital tax rate as exogenous, effectively assuming there is a maximum feasible level of LSK 
taxation. The welfare-maximizing government chooses the capital income tax rate and the labor 
income tax rate according to  
   1 2
,
ax ,m
L
L LSKv p pI RG R R
 
   .  (29) 
4.2 Parameter Values 
 In this section, we describe the parameter values used in our model. In the simulations, 
we consider a wide range of values for numerous key parameters.  
4.2.1 Production Function Parameters 
 The appropriate value for the elasticity of substitution in production is a contentious 
issue. Many simulation studies (e.g., Altig et al., 2001; Fehr et al., 2013) assume Cobb-Douglas 
production functions, and a relatively large degree of substitutability seems appropriate for our 
model given that two of our inputs are different types of capital.  Accordingly, in our benchmark 
case, we assume a Cobb-Douglas production function, that is, a unitary elasticity of substitution 
in production. However, Chirinko (2002) argues that a much lower elasticity of substitution 
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between capital and labor is appropriate; his preferred estimate is 0.4. Accordingly, we calibrate 
our simulation model for a wide range of substitution elasticities, varying from the Cobb-
Douglas case  1 2 1    to an elasticity of substitution in production as low as 1 2 0.25    
(Table 1). 
 In a recent paper that documents the decline in the labor share of income since the 1980s, 
Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014) estimate a global corporate labor share of around 60 percent, 
and an overall labor share of around 52.5 percent.  We assume that the labor share in sector one 
(the domestic sector) corresponds to the global share ( 2 0.525  ) and the labor share in sector 
two (the multinational corporate sector) corresponds to the global corporate share ( 2 0.60  ). 
 Cronin et al. (2013) estimate that roughly 63 percent of corporate income is due to above-
normal returns. Given a corporate labor income share of 60 percent, we choose the shares of 
ordinary capital and firm-specific capital to be consistent with the Cronin et al. estimate. That is, 
we choose our parameters so that the ratio of the total earnings attributable to above-normal 
returns to FSK, defined as the excess of actual returns to FSK over the returns to ordinary capital, 
to the total earnings from the normal returns to ordinary capital is 1.7 (=0.63/(1–0.63)).  This in 
turn implies that the ordinary capital and FSK shares in the MNC production function are 
1 0.148   and 1 21 0.252    . Similarly, assuming a labor share of 52.5 percent in the 
domestic sector implies 1 0.176   and 1 21 0.299   . 
 To calibrate the relative rate of return to FSK, we consider the literature studying the rate 
of return to investment in research and development. In a study of UK firms, Greenhalgh and 
Rogers (2006) find that the ratio of the shadow value of intangible to tangible assets is 3.5, but 
that this ratio varies considerably by sector, from 2.34 for software firms to 7.97 for production 
intensive firms. Following their baseline result, we set r = 0.1 and 0.35F  .  
 It is less clear how the rate of return to LSK should compare to the return to ordinary 
capital. Hou and Robinson (2006) find that in the United States firms in more concentrated 
markets earn lower stock market returns, while Gallagher, Ignatieva, and McCulloch (2015) find 
that in Australia firms in more concentrated markets are able to earn excess returns. Gallagher, 
Ignatieva, and McCulloch hypothesize that a more rigorous regulatory environment in United 
States explains this difference. Given this ambiguity, we choose a rate of return to LSK that is 
only 25 percent higher than the rate earned by ordinary capital, 0.125L  .  
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4.2.2 Utility Function Parameters 
 In 2012, foreign-controlled enterprises produced 37 percent of total GDP in the EU 
countries.10 Accordingly, the MNC produces 37 percent of GDP in our base case. To achieve 
this, we set the consumption share parameters for the representative resident at 1 6.15C   and 
2 4.08C  . The various   parameters determine the responsiveness of consumption and labor 
supply to changes in prices (including the wage) and income. We calibrate our demand price 
elasticity for the multinational good to –1.1 ( 2 1.22  ), consistent with Senhadji’s (1998) 
estimate that the average long-run price elasticity of import demand is slightly higher than one. 
Seale and Regmi (2006) estimate price elasticities across good types for a wide selection of 
countries; we select an intermediate value for the uncompensated price elasticity of the domestic 
good of –0.8 ( 1 0.615  ). 
 Turning to the labor supply parameters, in a Congressional Budget Office survey of 
recent research on labor supply elasticities, McClelland and Mok (2012) conclude that the 
substitution elasticity of labor supply for the total population in the U.S. is between 0.1 and 0.3, 
and that the income elasticity is between –0.1 and zero. Accordingly, we set the parameters of 
our utility function so that the labor supply substitution elasticity is 0.2, and the income elasticity 
is –0.05; this implies 0.413L   and 7.3L  . Note that these parameter values yield an 
uncompensated labor supply elasticity of 0.15, a value that is consistent with the consensus 
estimates in McClelland and Mok (2012) and comparable to the value of 0.18 used by Jacobs 
(2009). 
4.2.3 Government Spending and Tax Rates 
 We fix government services, which are assumed to be separable from the individual 
utility function, at roughly 16 percent of national income. This is consistent with the average 
                                                 
10
 Authors’ calculations based on data from Eurostat, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database, “GDP and main 
components” and “Foreign control of enterprises by economic activity and a selection of controlling countries.” 
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level (16.2 percent) reported by The World Bank’s World Development Indicators for high-FDI 
countries between 2000 and 2013.11  
 As discussed above, our “capital income tax rate” is a proxy for several concepts of 
capital income taxation, including statutory and various effective tax rates. We calibrate our 
model at a capital tax rate of   11 0. 8   , which reflects the average effective business-level 
capital income tax rate estimated by PricewaterhouseCoopers (2011) for high-FDI countries.12 
Under our base case assumption that the elasticity of substitution in production is 1 2 1.0   , 
this implies a labor tax rate of   0./ 1 22L L   . This labor tax rate, which is endogenously 
determined to balance the government budget constraint, assumes that 35 percent of labor 
income is exempted from the tax base ( 0.35E  ), reflecting provisions such as standard 
deductions, personal exemptions, and a variety of other deductions and exclusions. For example, 
in 2013, about 69 percent of the income reported on US tax returns was taxable, a figure that 
overstates the share of taxable income since filers with very low income levels are not required 
to file US tax returns.13  
 Globally, taxes on domestic natural resources vary considerably. In a recent survey, the 
International Monetary Fund (2012) reports high average effective tax rates on extractive 
industries. For the petroleum industry, these rates are generally between 65 and 85 percent of net 
present value. For mining industries, rates are somewhat lower, ranging from 45 to 65 percent. 
Accordingly, in our benchmark case, the direct tax on location-specific capital is set at 60 
percent ( 0.6)LSK  . We initially assume that none of the location-specific capital subject to this 
tax, 0LSK  , since LSK does not necessarily represent extraction activity, but consider the full 
range of possible values in our simulations (0 1)LSK  .  
                                                 
11
 We identify high-FDI countries as those whose average (2000–2013) foreign direct investment (FDI) net inflows 
as a share of GDP are in the top 50% reported internationally. This corresponds to countries whose FDI net inflows 
average above 3.7% of GDP between 2000 and 2013. These data were obtained from 
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=world-development-indicators. 
12
 The unweighted average of effective tax rates for high-FDI countries (as defined in footnote 11) in this study is 
17.5%, rising to 19.2% if the samples is restricted to countries with at least 10 observations. 
13
 See IRS SOI Tax Statistics, “Table 1.1 All Returns: Selected Income and Tax Items, Tax Year 2013,” 
https://www.irs.gov/uac/SOI-Tax-Stats---Individual-Statistical-Tables-by-Size-of-Adjusted-Gross-Income. 
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 As discussed in the introduction, in most circumstances the fraction of firm-specific 
capital that is subject to residual taxation in the home country ( )F  is likely be relatively small. 
However, it may be significant for (1) countries attempting to attract a significant share of their 
foreign direct investment from US-based MNCs that are not (and are not likely to be) in an 
excess foreign tax credit position, or (2) countries with tax rates that are (or will become with 
reform) sufficiently low that they trigger current residual home country taxation under various 
anti-base-erosion provisions—a category that may increase over time as more countries adopt 
such provisions. In our base case, we assume that the fraction of firm-specific capital that is 
subject to residual taxation is very small ( 0.01)F   and subject to a gross residual tax rate of 20 
percent. However, we simulate a wide variety of potential residual taxation scenarios, including 
 0.05 / 1 0.30FF     and 0.300 F  , corresponding to the range of values that might 
arise under anti-base-erosion provisions. 
 Finally, we assume that the effective tax haven rate is  / 1 0.05H H   , reflecting a 
combination of very low tax haven rates coupled with the costs of shifting income and deferring 
repatriation, which Grubert and Altshuler (2013) suggest range from 1–7 percent.  
4.2.4 Income Shifting Parameters 
 There is considerable disagreement about the fraction of capital income that is currently 
shifted abroad. Riedel (2014) surveys the literature on international tax avoidance and reports a 
range of 5 percent (found in the United Kingdom by HMRC (2014)) to 30 percent (found in the 
United States by Clausing (2011)).  In her most recent work, Clausing (2016) estimates that the 
amount of income shifted from the US corporate income tax base is 32–46 percent of current 
revenues. In our benchmark case, we adopt a fairly conservative assumption that income shifting 
is 15 percent of the corporate tax base ( / (1 ) 0.15S S    or 0.13S  ).
14, 15 Under the tax rates 
                                                 
14
 This aligns closely with the Dyreng and Markle (2015) estimate that income shifting the United States is roughly 
13 percent of revenues – although they note that because their sample size is relatively small, their estimate is not 
necessarily inconsistent with larger estimates such as those found by Clausing (2011). 
15
  Estimates of the tax semi-elasticity of income shifting provide another indicator of the degree of uncertainty 
about the extent of income shifting. For example, Clausing notes that her larger estimate implies a tax semi-elasticity 
of 3.3. This value, however, is relatively large in comparison to most others found in the literature; for example, 
Heckemeyer and Overesch (2013) argue that the consensus estimate of the tax semi-elasticity of income shifting is 
 27 
assumed in the model, this implies that the capital income shifting parameter is 0.65  . 
However, given the uncertainty about the extent of income shifting, we simulate a wide range of 
values for the share of income that is shifted abroad, 0.05 / (1 ) 0.50S S    .  
 There is considerably less literature on the shifting of labor income to the corporate 
income tax base. However, we expect the share of labor income shifted to be modest, as 
relatively few individuals both have the capability to shift labor income and potentially benefit 
from it. The two groups most likely to engage in labor income shifting are the self-employed and 
individuals working in small corporations. According to The World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators, about 35 percent of the employed population in high-FDI countries is self-employed, 
while in a sample of 20 OECD countries, around 24 percent of individuals work for companies 
with 10 or fewer employees.16 Accordingly, in our benchmark case we set 0.35I   and also 
consider cases where up to 50 percent of labor income can potentially be shifted. Given our 
assumption that 35 percent of labor income is exempt from taxation, we then assume 75 percent 
of remaining labor income is taxed at a rate exceeding the capital income tax rate. Additionally, 
we simply assume that a quarter of this potentially shiftable income is actually shifted to the 
corporate tax base. This calculation suggests that about 7 percent of labor income is shifted to the 
corporate tax base (   0./ 1 07I I   ), implying 0.16  . With 7 percent of labor income 
shifted to the corporate tax base, 8.7 percent of revenue raised by the capital tax reflects revenue 
raised from taxation of shifted labor income. This figure is slightly below the range of 10 to 17 
percent labor income shifting estimated in for the EU by de Mooij and Nicodème (2006).17 
                                                                                                                                                             
0.8, although Clausing (2016) argues that most of the papers cited in this study use data that does not adequately 
capture income shifting to tax havens. 
16
 This calculation is based on values from OCED (2012). The 20 countries with available data include Austria, 
Belgium, Brazil, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. 
17
  Our estimates may be conservative. Gordon and Slemrod (2000) estimate that a one percentage point decrease in 
the differential between the labor income and businesss tax rates leads to a fairly large 2.9 percent increase in 
personal income. When we simulate the effects of a small change in this tax rate differential at the initial equilibrium 
in our model, we obtain a smaller tax semi-elasticity of –1.36. 
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4.2.5 Other Parameters 
  Sercu and Vanpée (2007) examine a sample of 42 countries and estimate that the share 
of domestically-owned equity capital in total market capitalization is 80 percent. Accordingly, 
we assume in our benchmark case that the domestically-owned share of the location-specific 
capital is 0.8  . In the simulations, we consider the full range of possibilities for this 
parameter, 0 1  .  
4.3 Simulation Results 
 As mentioned above, we calibrate our model for various values of the elasticity of 
substitution in production, ranging from 1 2 1    to 1 2 0.25   , using the Cobb-Douglas 
formulation as the benchmark. In Table 1, we present the parameters used for calibration and 
welfare analysis for each 0.15 increment over this range of the production substitution elasticity. 
 Note that as the elasticity of substitution in production declines, the optimal capital 
income tax rate rises, as capital income taxation is less distortionary if capital-labor substitution 
in production is more difficult. For example, when the elasticity of substitution in production is 
1 2 1   , the optimal capital income tax rate is * /( * 0.160)1   , but as the production 
elasticity declines to 1 2 0.25   , the optimal capital income tax rate increases by nearly 18 
percent to * /( * 0.188)1   . 
 In addition, as the optimal capital income tax rate approaches the level in our baseline, 
 t / (1+t ) = 0.180, the welfare gains associated with reform – defined as moving from the 
benchmark initial equilibrium to the optimal capital income tax rate – naturally approach zero. 
For example, at the substitution elasticity 1 2 0.40   , the optimal capital income tax rate 
 t */(1+t*) = 0.182  is very close to the observed rate, so that capital income tax reform produces 
negligible welfare gains. By comparison, moving to the optimal capital income tax rate in the 
Cobb-Douglas case increases welfare by 0.53 percent of CIT revenues. Alternatively, consider 
the effects of moving from no taxation of capital income to the optimal capital income tax rate.  
In the Cobb-Douglas case, this results in a welfare gain of 4.97 percent of CIT revenues. 
However, at lower elasticities of substitution in production, the distortionary effects of capital 
income taxation are smaller, so the welfare gains associated with introducing a positive capital 
income tax rate are generally larger; for example, moving to the optimal capital income tax rate 
 29 
results in a welfare gain equal to 8.75 percent of CIT revenues in the case of an elasticity of 
substitution in production of 0.25. 
 In our benchmark calibration, 35 percent of labor income can be potentially be shifted 
( 0.35I  ), only 1 percent of MNC capital income is subject to residual taxation ( 0.01F  ), 
there is no direct taxation of LSK ( 0LSK  ), and 20 percent of LSK is foreign-owned ( 0.8  ). 
In this case, the optimal capital income tax rate is 
 t */(1+t*) = 0.160  and the labor income tax 
rate, which is determined as a residual from the government budget constraint, is 
  0./ 1 241L L   .  
 The results of various simulations of the model are shown in Figures 1–7, where the 
benchmark calibration is indicated with a triangle. The basic variations on the benchmark result 
are illustrated in Figures 1a-c, which show the optimal capital income tax rates for various 
assumptions about the share of LSK owned by foreigners (1 ) , the share of labor income that 
can be feasibly shifted ( I ), and the fraction of unshifted income subject to residual taxation 
( )F . Note that, in contrast to our main result in the analytical model, the optimal capital income 
tax rate is not zero even when all location-specific capital is owned domestically and there is no 
residual taxation, since a portion of the capital income tax base (LSK) is inelastic.18 However, the 
optimal capital income tax rate is small when there is no residual taxation, no potential for labor 
income shifting, and no foreign ownership of LSK, as the optimal rate is less than 3 percent, 
*/( *1 0.027)   (not shown). Thus, considered in isolation, the opportunity to tax immobile 
location-specific rents accruing to domestic residents does not provide much of a rationale for 
capital income taxation in the model. 
 With only 1 percent of capital in the multinational sector subject to residual taxation and 
no labor income shifting, Figure 1a shows that the optimal capital income tax rate is roughly 
linear with respect to the share of LSK that is owned by foreigners, beginning at   ./ 1 0 03    
when the foreign-owned share of LSK is zero and reaching a maximum of   ./ 1 0 26    when 
                                                 
18
  Tests removing LSK from domestic production indicate that the optimal capital tax rate is zero (with no residual 
taxation) as long as all capital investment is perfectly mobile, since the elasticity of labor supply is finite but non-
zero. Note also that the presence of LSK does not produce a positive optimal capital income tax rate in our analytical 
model because the alternative of taxing fixed labor supply has no distortionary cost in that case.  
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all of LSK is foreign-owned. Thus, the opportunity to tax foreign rents may provide an important 
rationale for taxing capital income, as stressed by Huizinga and Nielsen (1997). At the 
benchmark level of foreign ownership of 20 percent (with minimal residual taxation and no 
income shifting), the optimal capital income tax rate is 
 t */(1+t*) = 0.077 , which implies a 
labor income tax rate of   0./ 1 293L L   . 
 Figure 1a also shows that adding the possibility of a treasury transfer effect by including 
residual taxation increases the optimal capital income tax rate, but only until the domestic tax 
rate equals the assumed residual tax rate of 20 percent. Recall that in the analytical model with 
full residual taxation, the optimal capital tax rate is at least as high as the foreign tax rate. By 
expanding the model to include ordinary capital in both sectors, we include some mobile capital 
that we assume is not subject to residual taxation ( 1K ).  Although this diminishes the importance 
of the underlying treasury transfer effect, the presence of a residual tax still moves the optimal 
capital income tax rate toward the foreign tax rate. In all cases, the optimal tax rate plateaus at 
the assumed residual tax rate —  / 1 0.20F F   . Once this limit is reached, the optimal 
capital income tax rate remains constant until the foreign-owned share of LSK is large enough (in 
excess of 70 percent) to justify further increases, up to the maximum rate of 26.4 percent which 
occurs when all LSK is foreign-owned. 
  The same general pattern occurs in Figures 1b and 1c. However, these figures show that 
the sensitivity of the optimal capital income tax rate to foreign ownership of LSK depends 
heavily on the opportunity for labor income shifting. In all cases, the optimal capital income tax 
rate is 26.4 percent when all LSK is foreign-owned. However, at lower values of the foreign-
owned share of LSK, the optimal capital income tax rate generally increases as labor-income 
shifting opportunities increase, as increased capital income taxation allows lower labor income 
tax rates, both of which reduce the incentive for labor income shifting, which reduces revenues 
and incurs costs. For example, when 35 (50) percent of labor income can be feasibly shifted to 
the capital income tax base, the optimal capital income tax rate rises to */( *1 0.153)    
(0.172), even with minimal residual taxation and no foreign-ownership of LSK. This of course 
reduces the sensitivity of the optimal capital income tax rate to variation in the share of LSK that 
is foreign-owned.  
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 Figure 2 illustrates that if some direct taxation of location-specific capital is available 
(under the assumption that direct taxes paid on location-specific rents are deductible from the 
capital income tax), the optimal capital income tax rate declines significantly. As discussed 
above, this occurs because an alternative tax instrument can be used to extract rents from the 
owners of location-specific rents, including foreigners, without the negative consequences on 
capital flight and capital income shifting associated with use of the capital income tax. For 
example, under our base-case assumption that 20 percent of location-specific capital is foreign-
owned, the optimal capital income tax rate drops from 
 t */(1+t*) = 0.16  or 16 percent to 7.1 
percent if all rents from LSK can be taxed directly.19 And, if all LSK is foreign-owned, the 
optimal capital income tax rate drops from 26.4 percent to 9.4 percent.  In addition, the 
sensitivity of the optimal capital income tax rate with respect to foreign ownership of LSK 
declines with direct taxation, since rents earned by foreigners can be taxed directly. Indeed, in 
the extreme case in which all location-specific capital can be taxed directly, the optimal capital 
income tax barely increases with the foreign-owned share of LSK (from 
 t */(1+t*) = 0.066  with 
1   to 
 t */(1+t*) = 0.094  with 0  ). This slight increase occurs because above-normal 
returns to foreign-owned LSK are still included in the capital income tax base, with the direct tax 
on LSK deductible. 
 We turn next to the sensitivity of the results to changes in firm production function 
parameters. Figure 3 examines the interaction of the relative capital shares in the production of 
the domestic good with the availability of a direct tax on LSK. Specifically, consider an increase 
in the production cost share of LSK coupled with a reduction in the production cost share of 
ordinary capital. When there is no direct taxation of LSK, this increases the optimal capital 
income tax rate, as LSK is a greater share of the capital tax base. However, when LSK is taxed 
directly, any increases in the relative cost share of LSK increase the revenue raised from the 
direct taxation of LSK, lowering the optimal capital income tax rate (as well as the corresponding 
labor income tax rate since more revenue is available). For example, in the absence of direct LSK 
                                                 
19
 The optimal capital income tax rate does not drop to zero because it is still desirable to raise capital income 
revenue, reducing the labor income tax rate and the corresponding incentive for labor income shifting.  If labor 
income shifting were impossible, the optimal capital income tax rate would be very near zero in this case (1.7 
percent), even with variable labor supply. This small amount of capital taxation persists because LSK is still included 
in the capital income tax base (although the direct tax on LSK is fully deductible).  
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taxation, increasing the cost-share ratio for LSK to ordinary capital from 0.5 to 3.0 (the 
benchmark value is 1.7) increases the optimal capital income tax rate from 
 t */(1+t*) = 0.147  
to */( *1 0.172)   , while the labor income tax rate (not shown) declines from 
  0./ 1 259L L    to   0./ 1 229L L   .  However, if all LSK is taxed directly, the optimal 
capital income tax rate declines from 
 t */(1+t*) = 0.103 to  t */(1+t*) = 0.059and the labor 
income tax rate declines from   0./ 1 224L L    to   0./ 1 123L L   .  
  Figure 4 demonstrates that the amount of residual taxation is generally more influential in 
determining the optimal capital income tax rate than the residual tax rate. Changes in the residual 
tax rate have no effect on the optimal capital income tax rate so long as the residual tax rate is 
less than the domestic optimal capital income tax rate, which, in our base case, is as long as 
 / 0.1 160F F   . However, once the residual tax rate exceeds 16 percent, the optimal capital 
income tax rate equals the residual tax rate until the level of capital income taxation takes 
maximum advantage of the treasury transfer effect for the given amount of income subject to 
residual taxation (the kink point in each of the four graphs lies in the range 
 0.16 0.201F F   ). Beyond that point, the optimal capital income tax rate increases only 
slightly with increases in the residual tax rate. 
  In our benchmark calibration, 35 percent of labor income is exempt from labor taxation, 
producing a base-case optimal capital income tax rate of 
 t */(1+t*) = 0.160  and a 
corresponding labor income tax rate of   0./ 1 241L L   . However, Figure 5 shows that as the 
amount of taxable labor income declines, higher marginal tax rates on labor income are needed 
to raise revenue, increasing the labor-leisure distortion and the amount of labor income shifting 
associated with labor taxation. For example, with the 35 percent exemption, labor income 
shifting is calibrated to  / 1 0.07I I    (or 7 percent), but if 25 percent of income is exempt, 
shifted labor income decreases to 4.8 percent of taxable unshifted income. With these decreases 
in the distortionary cost of labor taxation, the optimal capital income tax rate also decreases 
modestly (from 16 percent to 15 percent). Consequently, as the amount of exempt labor income 
increases, both the optimal capital income and labor income tax rates increase. However, Figure 
5 demonstrates that the labor income tax increases more in response to labor exemptions than 
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does the optimal capital income tax rate, which is only moderately sensitive to changes in the 
share of exempt labor income.  
 Finally, and perhaps surprisingly, differences in opportunities for international income 
shifting have relatively little effect on the optimal capital income tax rate in the model. The 
simulation results presented in Figure 6 examine the effects of changes in the share of capital 
income shifted to the tax haven – achieved by changing the international income shifting cost 
parameter – on the optimal capital income tax rate, for three levels of residual taxation. Holding 
all other parameters at their base-case values and adjusting capital income shifting costs so that 
the share of capital income shifted to a tax haven in the base case increases from 5 percent to 50 
percent, the optimal capital income tax declines only from 
 t */(1+t*) = 0.162  to 
 t */(1+t*) = 0.155 . 
 This relatively small effect reflects three offsetting effects of an increase in international 
income shifting opportunities on the optimal capital income tax rate. First, as international 
income shifting increases due to lower shifting costs, the size of the domestic capital income tax 
base decreases so that the revenue raised by the capital income tax declines; the government’s 
desire to avoid this revenue loss puts downward pressure on the optimal capital income tax rate. 
Second, since location-specific capital cannot be shifted internationally, increased capital income 
shifting implies a larger share of the capital income tax base is immobile; this makes capital 
income taxation relatively more attractive and puts upward pressure on the optimal capital 
income tax rate. Third, as international capital income shifting increases, the negative effect on 
foreign direct investment of higher capital income taxes is muted, as foreign MNCs recognize 
that the cost of a higher domestic statutory tax rate is diminished by the potential to shift some of 
the income earned to a low tax jurisdiction – the cost of capital in the multinational sector is less 
affected by the statutory rate in the presence of income shifting, implying foreign direct 
investment is less sensitive to the capital income tax rate. This makes capital income taxation 
less costly to the government and puts upward pressure on the optimal capital income tax rate.  
 These three effects are illustrated in Figures 7a-c. Figure 7a shows the capital tax base, 
relative to the base case, as a function of the capital income tax rate for different levels of 
international income shifting costs. It demonstrates that lower shifting costs, which lead to more 
capital income shifting, result in a smaller capital income tax base and thus revenue losses for the 
domestic government, putting downward pressure on the optimal capital income tax rate. 
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  Figure 7b shows the LSK share of the capital income tax base as a function of the capital 
income tax rate for different levels of international income shifting costs. It demonstrates that 
lower shifting costs, which lead to more capital income shifting, result in a larger relative share 
of the capital tax base for LSK, making capital income taxation more attractive and thus putting 
upward pressure on the optimal capital income tax rate. 
 Finally, Figure 7c shows MNC investment, relative to the base case, as a function of the 
capital income tax rate for different levels of international income shifting costs. It demonstrates 
that lower shifting costs, which lead to more capital income shifting, result in slightly more 
investment at each value of the capital tax rate, as the potential for income shifting dampens the 
effect of capital income taxation on MNC investment. Figure 6 indicates that the last two factors 
are not large enough to offset the first factor described above, so that the optimal capital income 
tax rate declines, but only slightly, as the amount of international income shifting increases.  
5. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we analyze the optimal taxation of capital income for a small open 
economy that is attempting to balance the wide variety of factors that bear on the decision to 
impose a source-based tax on capital. On the one hand, the standard argument – the burden of a 
capital income tax imposed on internationally mobile capital will be borne entirely by local 
factors – suggests that the optimal capital income tax rate is zero. This argument is reinforced by 
concerns that mobile capital may include highly productive firm-specific capital owned by 
MNCs that earns above-normal returns, and that high capital income tax rates may induce 
international income shifting by MNCs that will reduce revenues, perhaps significantly. On the 
other hand, some capital income taxation is desirable even in a small open economy to tax 
above-normal returns earned by location-specific capital, especially to the extent that capital is 
owned by foreigners, to limit the shifting of labor income to the capital income tax base, and to 
take advantage of any “treasury transfer” effects that may be available. An additional 
complicating factor is that the opportunity to shift income internationally may mitigate the 
negative effects of higher capital income tax rates on FDI (since MNCs will know that the effects 
of a relatively high tax rate will be dampened via income shifting) and will increase the relative 
capital share of location-specific capital, increasing the relative desirability of more capital 
income taxation. 
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Our base analysis confirms the standard results: if all foreign-owned capital is perfectly 
mobile and there is no residual taxation, the optimal capital income tax rate is zero, while with 
full residual taxation, the optimal capital income tax rate never falls below the foreign residual 
tax rate as the government takes maximum advantage of the treasury transfer effects. But in the 
more relevant and more general cases, the optimal capital income tax rate falls between these 
two extremes, and is typically below the tax rate applied to labor income.     
The simulation results of course depend on the model specification and parameter values 
used. Subject to that caveat, the simulations provide several noteworthy results. First, although 
the opportunity to tax immobile location-specific rents accruing to domestic residents does not 
provide a significant rationale for capital income taxation in our benchmark case, the optimal 
capital income tax rate increases approximately linearly as the fraction of location-specific rents 
that accrue to foreigners increases, in some cases exceeding the tax rate on labor income. 
Second, an operative treasury transfer effect provides a strong rationale for capital income 
taxation – an effect that currently is not likely to be very important, but may become much more 
relevant over time, especially as domestic capital income tax rates decline, if more countries 
enact strict anti-base-erosion provisions. Third, the potential for labor income shifting puts 
upward pressure on capital income tax rates to reduce the labor-capital income tax differential, 
and also tends to reduce the variation in capital income tax rates. Fourth, the availability of a 
separate tax on the income earned by location-specific capital significantly reduces optimal 
capital income tax rates; for example, in the resource sector, this could be a separate income tax 
on LSK earnings or a resource rent tax (or any cash flow-based tax) that would apply tax only to 
the rents earned in that sector. Fifth, the optimal capital income tax rate is only moderately 
sensitive to wide variations in the shares of location-specific and ordinary capital. Sixth, the 
amount of residual taxation is generally more influential in determining the optimal capital 
income tax rate than the residual tax rate. Seventh, several offsetting effects of international 
income shifting imply that the optimal capital tax rate is only marginally sensitive to the costs of 
international income shifting, declining slightly as such costs decrease and the amount of income 
shifting increases.  
 36 
 These simulations suggest that determining the optimal level of source-based capital 
income taxation is indeed a difficult problem.20  For many countries, various factors are likely to 
make the standard argument for complete exemption of capital income from source-based 
taxation an incomplete guide to tax policy, as some taxation of capital income is desirable under 
most circumstances. The primary exception is when a separate tax can be applied to much or all 
of the income of location-specific capital (or such capital is an insignificant factor in production); 
in this case, optimal capital income tax rates are quite low, and administrative concerns suggest 
that maintaining capital income taxation only to tax capital income at a very low rate may not be 
desirable.   
 At the same time, the optimal level of capital income taxation in our simulations is 
typically significantly below the tax rate applied to labor income, especially as the share of labor 
income exempt from taxation decreases, suggesting that the standard comprehensive income tax 
approach is not likely to be desirable either. Instead, more flexible tax systems, such as the dual 
income tax systems observed in several Nordic countries and elsewhere, may be optimal as they 
can achieve a balance between capital and labor income taxation that is best suited to the 
circumstances of a particular country – assuming that income shifting from the relatively highly 
taxed labor income base to the relatively lowly taxed capital income tax base can be controlled.  
 We note that the prospect of residual taxation can potentially play an important role in 
determining the optimal capital income tax rate. This is currently a relatively unimportant issue, 
since the United States is the only major country with a residence-based system and tempers its 
effects by allowing deferral of tax until funds are repatriated to a US parent and allowing 
generous cross-crediting of foreign tax credits. Nevertheless, residual taxation may become a 
more important factor, especially at relatively low levels of domestic capital income taxation, if 
more countries introduce current residual taxes as part of anti-base-erosion measures.  
 We close by noting that our results are generated in a static setting, and thus ignore some 
interesting dynamics that might affect the optimal capital income tax rate and should be the 
subject of further research. For example, Coates (1993) highlights the importance of imperfect 
                                                 
20
  There are of course numerous other factors not considered in our model that would also impact this decision 
(see, for example, Auerbach (2008) and Zodrow (2007)); in particular, we consider only business level taxation and 
ignore equity concerns. One particularly interesting factor is the extent to which capital income taxation can serve as 
a proxy for welfare-enhancing age-specific taxation (Erosa and Gervais, 2002; Weinzierl, 2011). 
 37 
capital mobility in a repeated game, arguing that the relative immobility of capital that could be 
attracted to a region puts further downward pressure on the capital income tax rate. However, the 
overall impact of dynamic considerations on capital tax competition is not obvious. Cardarelli, 
Taugourdeau, and Vidal (2002) acknowledge the reality that competition for mobile capital is a 
repeated game and consider the potential impacts of cooperation in rate setting. By employing 
trigger strategies, countries may be able to increase capital taxes simultaneously, raising revenue 
without generating capital outflows – although the gains from cooperation are limited by 
asymmetry between countries. 
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Table 1 
Optimal Capital Taxation Model, Optimal Tax Rates, and Welfare Effects, as 
a Function of the Elasticity of Substitution in Production 
Varying the Elasticity of Substitution 
 1.00i   0.85i   0.70i   0.55i   0.40i    0.25i    
G 0.198 0.2012 0.2055 0.211 0.217 0.2247 
dK   4.5 4.55 4.6 4.62 4.68 4.73 
LSK 1.37 1.39 1.42 1.46 1.495 1.528 
1   0.176 0.176 0.176 0.176 0.176 0.176 
2   0.525 0.509 0.482 0.437 0.353 0.185 
1   0.148 0.152 0.157 0.162 0.177 0.208 
2   0.6 0.62 0.65 0.69 0.725 0.753 
La   7.3 7.3 7.3 7.3 7.3 7.3 
1Ca   6.15 6.15 6.15 6.15 6.15 6.15 
2Ca   4.08 4.05 3.96 3.8 3.65 3.38 
1   0.615 0.615 0.615 0.615 0.615 0.615 
2   1.22 1.22 1.22 1.22 1.22 1.22 
L   0.413 0.412 0.415 0.417 0.418 0.421 
Invariant Parameters 
  0./ 1 20F F     2 0.9p    0LSK    0.8    0.16    0.35I   
  0./ 1 05H H     0.1r    0.35E   2.85H    0.65     
 1 0.3/ 75LSK LSK     0.35F    0.01F       
Optimal Tax Rates 
 t */(1+t*)  
0.160 0.165 0.170 0.177 0.182 0.188 
 
t
L
* / (1+t
L
*)   0.241 0.236 0.230 0.223 0.216 0.210 
Excess Burden as a Percent of Capital Income Tax Revenue (At Initial Calibration Point) 
  ./ 1 0 18    0.53% 0.29% 0.11% 0.00% 0.00% 0.06% 
  ./ 1 0 00    4.97% 5.92% 7.03% 8.08% 8.64% 8.75% 
Capital Investment Changes Under Reform ( *0.00  ) 
 1 2% KK    -29.36% -24.90% -20.28% -15.60% -11.04% -6.33% 
% FSK   -46.31% -39.41% -32.34% -25.22% -18.35% 11.08% 
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Figure 1 
Note: All parameters are set to base-case values unless otherwise indicated. For these figures, this implies that there is no direct 
taxation of LSK, 35% of labor income is exempt from taxation, the elasticity of substitution in production is one, the gross residual tax 
rate is 20%, and 1% of capital in the multinational sector is subject to residual taxation. 
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Figure 2 
 
Note: All parameters are set to base-case values unless otherwise indicated. For this figure, this implies 35% of labor income can be 
feasibly shifted, 35% of labor income is exempt from taxation, the elasticity of substitution in production is one, the gross residual tax 
rate is 20%, and 1% of capital in the multinational sector is subject to residual taxation. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3  
 
Note: All parameters are set to base-case values unless otherwise indicated. For this figure, this implies 35% of labor income can be 
feasibly shifted, 20% of LSK is foreign-owned, 35% of labor income is exempt from taxation, the elasticity of substitution in 
production is one, the gross residual tax rate is 20%, and 1% of capital in the multinational sector is subject to residual taxation. 
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Figure 4  
 
Note: All parameters are set to base-case values unless otherwise indicated. For this figure, this implies 35% of labor income can be feasibly 
shifted, 35% of labor income is exempt from taxation, the elasticity of substitution in production is one, 20% of LSK is foreign-owned, and 
there is no direct taxation of LSK. 
Figure 5 
 
Note: All parameters are set to base-case values unless otherwise indicated. For this figure, this implies 35% of labor income can be 
feasibly shifted, 35% of labor income is exempt from taxation, the elasticity of substitution in production is one, 20% of LSK is 
foreign-owned, there is no direct taxation of LSK, the gross residual tax rate is 20%, and 1% of capital in the multinational sector is 
subject to residual taxation. 
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Figure 6 
 
Note: Adjustments to the share of capital income shifted in the base case are achieved by adjusting the shifting cost. All other 
parameters are set to base-case values unless otherwise indicated. For this figure, this implies 35% of labor income can be feasibly 
shifted, 35% of labor income is exempt from taxation, the elasticity of substitution in production is one, 20% of LSK is foreign-owned, 
there is no direct taxation of LSK, and the gross residual tax rate is 20%. 
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Figure 7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: All parameters are set to base-case values unless otherwise indicated. For this figure, this implies 35% of labor income can be 
feasibly shifted, 35% of labor income is exempt from taxation, the elasticity of substitution in production is one, 20% of LSK is 
foreign-owned, there is no direct taxation of LSK, the gross residual tax rate is 20%, and 1% of capital in the multinational sector is 
subject to residual taxation. The low shifting cost is chosen so 50% of capital income is shifted internationally in the base case. The 
high shifting cost is chosen so 5% of capital income is shifted internationally in the base case. 
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